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ABSTRACT
Environmental contention is mounting all across China. In particular, protests 
against environmentally hazardous construction projects have become a 
frequent phenomenon, spreading well beyond China’s major cities. While 
these protests are gaining academic attention, they have mostly been 
analysed as separate phenomena in isolation from each other. Moreover, such 
grievance-based environmental contention has largely been investigated 
separately from ‘environmentalist’ activism underpinned by environmental 
organizations and broader environmental concerns. Yet recent protests 
against the construction of facilities such as waste incinerators and industrial 
facilities reveal the emergence of linkages and diffusion processes between 
cases and actors that challenge depictions of Chinese environmental 
contention as a necessarily purely localized and parochial affair. This article 
examines this new development in Chinese environmental activism through 
a detailed case study of an anti-incinerator campaign centred on a village in 
Hebei Province. It shows how linkages emerged horizontally between local 
residents and community activists involved in anti-incinerator campaigns 
elsewhere, and vertically between villagers and members of China’s nascent 
‘no burn’ community, a group of actors highly critical of waste incineration 
in China. This article concludes that both types of linkages were crucial 
for the development and success of the villagers’ campaign. Although 
the opportunity for upward scale-shift based on active intra-community 
collaboration remains highly constrained, vertical ties and non-relational 
horizontal linkages ensure that the impact of environmental campaigns 
reaches beyond the immediate localities in which they occur.
Introduction
During the past decade, environmental activism in China has undergone significant change. Pollution 
victims and grassroots communities have become increasingly outspoken in demanding a clean living 
environment, and have pursued this through a diverse claims-making repertoire ranging from peti-
tioning and environmental litigation to more disruptive protests and sit-ins.1 In urban areas, large-scale 
1anna lora-Wainwright, ‘introduction. Dying for Development: pollution, illness and the limits of Citizens’ agency in China’, The 
China Quarterly 214, (2013), pp. 243–254; melinda herrold-menzies, ‘peasant resistance against nature reserves’, in Reclaiming 
Chinese Society. The New Social Activism (london; new york: routledge, 2010), ch. 5, pp. 83–98; yanhua Deng and Guobin yang, 
‘pollution and protest in China: environmental mobilization in Context’, The China Quarterly 214, (2013), pp. 321–336; h. Christoph 
Steinhardt and fengshi Wu, ‘in the name of the public: environmental protest and the Changing landscape of popular Contention 
in China’, The China Journal 75(1), (2016), pp. 61–82.
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protests against environmentally hazardous facilities have become commonplace.2 Meanwhile, advances 
in Chinese environmental law and a growing legal consciousness have resulted in local communities 
and environmental organizations turning to lawyers and legal organizations for support.3 In light of the 
knowledge-dependent and highly contested environmental risks characteristic of modern societies,4 
experts have also become important players in the environmental arena.5 And environmental journal-
ists continue to play important roles in exposing pollution and working closely with environmental 
groups.6 China’s green sphere, therefore, increasingly represents a complex network of actors that go far 
beyond the environmental organizations long regarded as the core of environmental activism in China.
In Western societies, linkages and networks between diverse actors make up and drive environ-
mental movements. Connections between grievance-driven affected communities and environmental 
organizations were key for the emergence and development of local contentious struggles and for their 
‘scaling-up’ into broader environmental movements.7 Furthermore, linkages that developed between 
different affected communities helped produce ‘protest waves’ and ‘cycles of contention’ in Western 
societies.8 Yet the processes through which localized campaigns transcend local arenas and form larger 
movements remain poorly understood.9 This is particularly so in illiberal political regimes where the 
dynamics of contention widely diverge from those observed in democratic contexts.10
In China, connections between different actor groups in the environmental arena have received little 
academic attention. Chinese environmental activism literature has thus far focused either on the activ-
ities of ‘embedded’ environmental organizations11 or, more recently, on local grievance-based conten-
tion.12 Both aspects have, however, been investigated as largely separate facets of China’s green activism. 
This is partly due to the observation that Chinese environmental organizations shun engagements at 
2Steinhardt and Wu, ‘in the name of the public’; thomas Johnson, ‘the politics of Waste incineration in Beijing: the limits of a 
top-Down approach?’, Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 15(1), (2013), pp. 109–128; Xiaoyi Sun, ronggui huang and 
ngai-ming yip, ‘political Contexts and environmental forces linking up: a Case Study of anti-pX Contention in Kunming’, Journal 
of Contemporary China 26(106), (2017), pp. xxxxx; Zi Zhu, ‘Backfired Government action and the Spillover effect of Contention: a 
Case Study of the anti-pX protest in maoming, China’, Journal of Contemporary China 26(106), (2017), pp. xxxxx.
3rachel e. Stern, Environmental Litigation in China: A Study in Political Ambivalence (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 
2013); Xing ying, ‘Barefoot lawyers and rural Conflicts’, in Reclaiming Chinese Society. The New Social Activism (london; new 
york: routledge, 2010), ch. 4, pp. 64–82.
4ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (london: Sage publications, 1992).
5Benjamin van rooij, ‘the people vs. pollution: understanding Citizen action against pollution in China’, Journal of Contemporary 
China, 19(63), (2010), pp. 55–77; anna lora-Wainwright, ‘the inadequate life: rural industrial pollution and lay epidemiology in 
China’, The China Quarterly 214, (2013), pp. 302–320; Jennifer holdaway, ‘environment and health in China: an introduction to 
an emerging research field’, Journal of Contemporary China, 19(63), (2010), pp. 1–22
6Sam Geall, ‘China’s environmental Journalists: a rainbow Confusion’, in China and the Environment: The Green Revolution (london: 
Zed Books, 2013), ch. 1, pp. 15–39.
7Christopher rootes, ‘environmental movements’, in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (malden, ma: Blackwell 
publishers, 2004), ch. 26, pp. 608–640; Doug mcadam and hilary Schaffer Boudet, Putting Social Movements in Their Place: 
Explaining Opposition to Energy Projects in the United States, 2000–2005 (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2012); edward 
Walsh, rex Warland and Douglas Clayton Smith, Don’t Burn It Here: Grassroots Challenges to Trash Incinerators (university park, 
pa: pennsylvania State university press, 1997).
8Doug mcadam, Doug and Dieter rucht, ‘the Cross-national Diffusion of movement ideas’, The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 528(1), (1993), pp. 56–74; Sarah Soule, ‘Diffusion processes Within and across movements’, in The 
Blackwell Companion to Social Movements (malden, ma: Blackwell publishers, 2004), ch. 13, pp. 294–310; Sidney tarrow, ‘Dynamics 
of Diffusion: mechanisms, institutions, and Scale Shift, in The Diffusion of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and Political 
Effects (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2010), ch. 11, pp. 204–219.
9mcadam and Boudet, Putting Social Movements in Their Place, p. 134.
10maryjane osa and Kurt Schock, ‘a long, hard Slog: political opportunities, Social networks and the mobilization of Dissent in 
non-Democracies’, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change 27, (2007), pp. 123–153; paul D. almeida, ‘opportunity 
organizations and threat-induced Contention: protest Waves in authoritarian Settings’, American Journal of Sociology 109(2), 
(2003), pp. 345–400.
11peter ho and richard louis edmonds (eds), China’s Embedded Activism: Opportunities and Constraints of a Social Movement 
(london: routledge, 2008); lei Xie, Environmental Activism in China (london: routledge, 2009).
12Van rooij, ‘the people vs. pollution’; lora-Wainwright, ‘introduction. Dying for Development’; Deng and yang, ‘pollution and protest 
in China’.
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the local level,13 whilst local communities are often portrayed as ‘isolated’ from intermediary support14 
and their resistance is generally regarded as locally contained, parochial and disconnected.15 Studies of 
environmental contention in China have therefore largely focused on individual cases whilst overlook-
ing linkages and diffusion processes between different affected communities and between pollution 
victims and ‘embedded’ actors.
This article shows how an increasingly complex network is emerging between various actors within 
China’s environmental arena, connecting environmentalists with grievance-based activism. To investi-
gate these ties, it develops a conceptual framework to analyse horizontal and vertical linkages between 
environmental actors, their impacts on local contention, and their potential for fostering the scaling up 
of local struggles. It then applies this to an anti-incinerator campaign centred on Hebei’s Panguanying 
village. Based on several months of field research and systematic events data analysis, we show how 
local farmers successfully obstructed the incinerator’s construction with help from Beijing-based inter-
mediaries. These intermediaries, which include environmental organizations, experts and lawyers, are 
sceptical about the rapid spread of incineration in China, and comprise what we label China’s ‘no-burn’ 
community. We illustrate how villagers’ horizontal ties with other contentious communities and vertical 
ties to the Chinese ‘no-burn’ community played a pivotal role in the development of the campaign. Yet 
the article also shows that prospects for the ‘scaling up’ of local contention within the Chinese political 
context remain highly constrained.
Horizontal and Vertical Linkages and the Diffusion of Contention
Contentious struggles are rarely isolated episodes. Rather, insurgents influence and learn from each 
other across time and space, something best captured by the notion of ‘diffusion of contention’. Diffusion 
processes, which broadly refer to ‘the flow of social practices among actors within some larger system’,16 
are central to the emergence and development of “protest waves” or “cycles of contention”.17 Diffusion 
is thus an integral part of ‘upward’ scale shift, generally understood as a shift in the scope and scale of 
contentious issues from the local to regional, national or transnational levels.18
Social movement scholars in this vein have largely focused on how tactics and movement frames 
spread across social movements or geographic spaces, encompassing a behavioural and ideational 
dimension. They have mapped out the communication channels along which these tactics and ideas 
have travelled and how they have been adopted or “emulated”.19 The diffusion of contention concept 
has therefore mainly been used to highlight what we term horizontal linkages between geographically 
dispersed insurgents.
However, vertical linkages are also pivotal in the spread and development of local environmental con-
tention. Whereas horizontal linkages refer to diffusion processes occurring between contentious commu-
nities, vertical linkages connect affected communities with supra-local ‘environmentalist’ organizations 
13ho and edmonds, China’s Embedded Activism.
14Van rooij, ‘the people vs. pollution’.
15yongshun Cai, Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail (palo alto, Ca: Stanford university press, 2010); 
Xi Chen, Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2011); Kevin o’Brien 
and lianjiang li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (new york: Cambridge university press, 2006).
16Soule, ‘Diffusion processes Within and across movements’, p. 295. are central to the emergence and development of ‘protest waves’ 
or ‘cycles of contention’
17mcadam and rucht, ‘the Cross-national Diffusion of movement ideas’; Doug mcadam, ‘“initiator” and “Spin-off” movements: 
Diffusion processes in protest Cycles’, in Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action (Durham: Duke university press, 1995), 217–239; 
tarrow, ‘Dynamics of Diffusion’; mark traugott, ‘recurrent patterns of Collective action’, in Repertoires and Cycles of Collective 
Action (Durham: Duke university press, 1995), pp. 1–14
18Doug mcadam, hilary Schaffer Boudet, Jennifer Davis, ryan J. orr, W. richard Scott and raymond e. levitt, ‘“Site fights”: explaining 
opposition to pipeline projects in the Developing World’, Sociological Forum 25(3), (2010), pp. 401–427.
19rebecca Kolins Givan, Kenneth m. roberts and Sarah a. Soule, ‘introduction: the Dimensions of Diffusion’, in The Diffusion of Social 
Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2010), ch. 1, pp. 1–15; Soule, 
‘Diffusion processes Within and across movements’; tarrow, ‘Dynamics of Diffusion’.
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and actors. Although local community concerns often clash with environmentalists’ priorities,20 they 
have nonetheless frequently found common ground for collaborative action.21 Similarly, experts, law-
yers and other individuals have provided multifaceted assistance to contentious local communities, 
ranging from information provision to more active local engagement.22 Van Rooij terms this group 
‘intermediaries’.23 An encompassing analytical framework of how linkages between different actors 
impact environmental contention must therefore incorporate both horizontal and vertical ties.
The study of the diffusion of contention encompasses three aspects. First, channels of diffusion are 
the pathways along which transmission occurs. Here, scholars distinguish relational from non-rela-
tional channels.24 Relational channels transmit information through node-to-node interpersonal ties 
or networks, encompassing face-to-face interactions and communication across space and time using 
communications technology. Alternatively, diffusion can also occur via non-relational channels, most 
notably through mass media and the Internet.25 The former are particularly important in authoritarian 
regimes, where informal network ties ‘substitute both for organizations and the mass media’ in the 
dissemination of uncensored information.26
Second, scholars are concerned with the contents of diffusion, which essentially boils down to infor-
mation.27 Information is central to environmental contention, where “the issues that ultimately motivate 
these disputes are initially far more ambiguous and uncertain than is true for rights movements”.28 The 
interpretive processes by which affected actors try to understand their situations are heavily dependent 
on knowledge, information and expertise. Diffusion processes can be crucial in disseminating trusted 
information including evidence and data.29 Intermediaries have been pivotal in providing local com-
munities with (publicly inaccessible) information about prevalent or pending risks, expertise needed 
for taking action, and by framing environmental issues in a way that ‘legitimiz[es] local concerns and 
politicize[s] local perspectives’.30 Both horizontal and vertical linkages can also offer broader issue 
interpretations, frames and environmental concepts employed by regional, national or transnational 
movements that may be adapted to the local context.31 Here, intermediaries often play the role of 
‘translating’ information from one context to another.32
20mcadam and Boudet, Putting Social Movements in their Place, p. 135.
21Christopher rootes, ‘acting locally: the Character, Contexts and Significance of local environmental mobilisations’, Environmental 
Politics 16(5), (2007), pp. 722–741, p. 725.
22Van rooij, ‘the people vs. pollution’; Sabrina mcCormick, Mobilizing Science: Movements, Participation, and the Remaking of 
Knowledge (philadelphia: temple university press, 2009); Walsh et al., Don’t Burn it Here; Setsuko matsuzawa, ‘Citizen environmental 
activism in China: legitimacy, alliances, and rights-Based Discourses’, ASIANetwork Exchange 19(2), (2012), pp. 81–91.
23See note 14.
24Givan et al., ‘introduction: the Dimensions of Diffusion’; pamela oliver and Daniel myers, ‘networks, Diffusion, and Cycles of Collective 
action’, in Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (oxford: oxford university press, 2003), 
ch. 8, pp. 173–203; Soule, ‘Diffusion processes Within and across movements’.
25as a third pathway of diffusion, the literature outlines ‘mediated diffusion’ or brokerage, i.e. diffusion based on the engagement 
of brokers – third parties that deliberately ‘connect people who would not have otherwise met’ (tarrow ‘Dynamics of Diffusion’, 
p. 209). in this paper, brokerage is not conceptualized as a separate pathway of diffusion but as an intermediary mechanism as 
outlined below.
26maryjane osa, ‘networks in opposition: linking organizations through activists in the polish people’s republic’, in Social Movements 
and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (oxford: oxford university press, 2003), ch. 4, pp. 77–104, p. 78; see 
also Carsten t. Vala and Kevin J. o’Brien, ‘recruitment to protestant house Churches’, in Popular Protest in China (Cambridge, ma: 
harvard university press, 2008), ch. 5, pp. 108–125.
27oliver and myers, ‘networks, Diffusion, and Cycles of Collective action’. information is central to environmental contention, where 
‘the issues that ultimately motivate these disputes are initially far more ambiguous and uncertain than is true for rights movements’
28mcadam and Boudet, Putting Social Movements in their Place, p. 97.
29frank fischer, Citizens, Experts, and the Environment: The Politics of Local Knowledge (Durham, nC: Duke university press, 2000); 
mcCormick, Mobilizing Science; lora-Wainwright, ‘the inadequate life’; robert futrell, ‘framing processes, Cognitive liberation, 
and nimBy protest in the u.S. Chemical-Weapons Disposal Conflict’, Sociological Inquiry 73(3), (2003), pp. 359–386; Sylvia noble 
tesh, Uncertain Hazards: Environmental Activists and Scientific Proof (ithaca, ny: Cornell university press, 2000).
30mcCormick, Mobilizing Science, p. 66.
31Kate Burningham and martin o’Brien, ‘Global environmental Values and local Contexts of action’, Sociology 28(4), (1994), 
pp. 913–932
32paul f. Steinberg, Environmental Leadership in Developing Countries: Transnational Relations and Biodiversity Policy in Costa 
Rica and Bolivia (Cambridge, ma: the mit press, 2001).
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However, beyond information flows, intermediaries have also supported local communities with 
more manifest resources, including financial or material resources and training.33 They sometimes repre-
sent affected populations by advocating their claims and issue frames.34 Intermediaries can also facilitate 
access to justice through legal assistance and by gathering evidence related to, for example, pollution or 
procedural irregularities. They can also provide access to other intermediaries.35 While these functions 
can also be performed through horizontal linkages, they are largely attributed to vertical ties. Taken 
together, the contents transmitted via horizontal and vertical linkages thus encompass both information 
flows and the sharing of more tangible resources.
Finally, scholars have examined the effects of diffusion. Five core mechanisms explain how infor-
mation transmitted via horizontal and vertical linkages may impact local environmental contention. 
First, external information and ‘cognitive cues’ regarding prevalent or potential risks may impact the 
adopters’ awareness process by facilitating the emergence of grievances, blame attribution, and cog-
nitive justification for resistance.36 Second, information about contentious action in other localities 
and the authorities’ reactions may change the adopting actors’ perceptions of threat and opportunity, 
which may influence both the onset and mode of action. Particularly in authoritarian regimes, such 
knowledge can be pivotal in mobilizing contention since it alters the adopting actors’ perceptions 
of what is politically feasible.37 Third, information flows may affect ‘identity formation’ – activists in 
one locale may identify with contenders elsewhere, thus forming broader ‘imagined communities’.38 
Fourth, information flows between communities may impact the resource structure of the adopt-
ing community, thus facilitating the mobilization and organization of local contention.39 Horizontal 
and vertical linkages may thus help fill resource-gaps highly relevant for taking action, particularly 
for resource-poor communities. And finally, experts and other authoritative intermediaries are cru-
cial in ‘certifying’ information. Information needs to be validated to attain credibility both within 
affected communities (‘internal certification’) and in the eyes of the broader public and other potential 
sympathizers (‘external certification’) since environmental and health-related contention is heavily 
dependent on ‘neutral experts’ or influential public figures to interpret the issues at stake in a cred-
ible manner.40
In addition, intermediaries can further foster horizontal linkages by ‘brokering’ communication 
and mutual recognition between otherwise largely isolated groups.41 The establishment of hori-
zontal linkages between different communities in this way may thus impact local environmental 
contention via the above mechanisms. While brokerage roles are generally attributed to interme-
diaries, they may also be performed by community actors who connect previously unconnected 
sites or social groups.
33mcadam and Boudet, Putting Social Movements in their Place, p. 120; mcCormick, Mobilizing Science, pp. 63–69; Walsh et al., 
Don’t Burn it Here, pp. 15–16.
34matsuzawa, ‘Citizen environmental activism in China’; mcCormick, Mobilizing Science.
35Van rooij, ‘the people vs. pollution’; herrold-menzies, ‘peasant resistance against nature reserves’; lei Xie, ‘China’s environmental 
activism in the age of Globalization’, Asian Politics & Policy 3(2), (2011), pp. 207–224; Guobin yang, ‘Civic environmentalism’, in 
Reclaiming Chinese Society. The New Social Activism (london: routledge, 2010), ch. 7, pp. 119–139
36William felstiner, richard l. abel and austin Sarat, ‘the emergence and transformation of Disputes: naming, Blaming, Claiming’, 
Law & Society Review 15(3–4), (1980), pp. 631–654; futrell, ‘framing processes’; Van rooij, ‘the people vs. pollution’.
37Susanne lohmann, ‘the Dynamics of informational Cascades: the monday Demonstrations in leipzig, east Germany, 1989–91’, World 
Politics 47(1), (1994), pp. 42–101; Daniel myers, ‘Collective action, Social movement theory and authoritarian regimes.’ Mobilization: 
An International Journal, 15(3), (2010), pp. 289–321; osa, ‘networks in opposition’; osa and Schock, ‘a long, hard Slog’.
38osa, ‘networks in opposition’, pp. 78–79; Soule, ‘Diffusion processes Within and across movements’, p. 296; Steinhardt and Wu, ‘in 
the name of the public’.
39mcadam et al., ‘“Site fights”’.
40fischer, Citizens, Experts, and the Environment; mcCormick, Mobilizing Science; tesh, Uncertain Hazards.
41mario Diani, ‘“leaders” or Brokers? positions and influence in Social movement networks’, in Social Movements and Networks: 
Relational Approaches to Collective Action (oxford: oxford university press, 2003), ch. 5, pp. 105–122
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Together, therefore, horizontal and vertical linkages may impact local environmental contention 
through five core mechanisms that support the mobilization and organization of action. We now apply 
this framework to the Panguanying anti-incinerator campaign, which began in 2009.
Making the Most of External Linkages: The Case of Hebei’s Panguanying Village
Panguanying village (潘官营村, Panguanying cun) houses around 1,800 residents. It is located 
in Liushouying town (留守营镇, Liushouying zhen) of Funing county (阜宁县, Funing xian) in the 
Qinhuangdao city area (秦皇岛市, Qinhuangdao shi). In this section, the Panguanying villagers’ ties 
with other contentious communities and intermediaries will be outlined within the context of the 
unfolding ‘anti-incinerator campaign’.
First Stages of Awareness and the Onset of Action: Land Concerns and Procedural Flaws
On 16 April 2009, a villager surnamed Pan noticed local cadres encircling collective village farmland 
tenured by several families in Panguanying and a neighbouring village. Upon inquiring, he discovered 
local government plans to build a waste incinerator on this site just a few hundred metres away from 
Panguanying.42 That evening, a small crowd of villagers confronted the village head about the sale of 
collective land without their prior knowledge. However, the village head referred to orders from higher 
levels, cautioned farmer Pan not to make trouble, and told the villagers to contact relevant higher-level 
authorities to voice concern.43
The following day, villagers began to investigate the project details and legality of the land requi-
sitioning, and petitioned higher-level authorities from the town to the provincial level.44 Farmer Pan 
gathered a small group of villagers to contest what they insisted was the illegal sale of collective land. 
They included a knowledgeable elderly farmer, also surnamed Pan (no direct relative of farmer Pan), 
who became a second key figure in the villagers’ struggle.45 The core group of villagers around the two 
Pans gradually learned more about the planned project, a Waste-to-Energy (WtE) facility jointly planned 
by the Qinhuangdao city government and private company Zhejiang Weiming (浙江伟明环保股份有
限公司, Zhejiang weiming huanbao gufen youxian gongsi). They uncovered several flaws in the project’s 
approval and decision-making process,46 and demanded that construction be halted and that the 
land be returned to its original state.47 By mid-May 2009, however, various government departments 
involved in the project confirmed its legality. The Hebei Province Environmental Protection Bureau 
(Hebei EPB) approved the project, upon which construction began.48 Villagers’ continued petitioning 
efforts remained unanswered until September that year, when the Funing county government bowed 
to mounting public pressure by temporarily halting construction based on procedural flaws identified 
by the villagers.49
During this initial stage, farmers were primarily angered by the local government’s lack of commu-
nication with – and ‘cheating’ of – the villagers, the alleged unlawful requisitioning of collective land, 
and concern about the improper distribution of compensation funds. As one farmer recalled:
When we started we had no experience. They were taking away our land. We wanted to obstruct this from a land 
perspective, not let them build [the incinerator]. We have to eat from the land they wanted to claim. So we started 
to fight.50
42interviews pGy 1 4-1-12, 27-7-13 (see appendix for full list of interviews); D_pGy5 to D_pGy 7.
43ibid.; interviews pGy 2 4-11-12, 5-11-12.
44D_pGy6, D_pGy8, D_pGy9.
45interviews pGy1 27-7-13, pGy3 28-7-13.
46D_pGy12 to D_pGy14.
47D_pGy15.
48D_pGy10, D_pGy16 to D_pGy19.
49interview pGy1 27-7-13; D_pGy_21.
50interview pGy2 4-11-12.
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From Land to Pollution: Horizontal Linkages
Construction resumed in May 2010,51 bringing new urgency to the villagers’ campaign. In preceding 
months, news about the planned incinerator project had spread. Concerns had been raised by villag-
ers including a teacher who had heard about environmental harm associated with incineration, and 
by the former head of a local paper mill’s environmental department who had previously discounted 
incineration as an option for handling the mill’s waste due to the related risks.52 Warnings about envi-
ronmental pollution and health hazards, particularly dioxin-related cancer risks, resonated with villagers. 
Local industries, including the paper mill, a fertilizer plant, and a slaughterhouse, had already seriously 
polluted the local environment, and cancer rates in the village had been high for years.53
Farmers’ concerns deepened after watching a China Central Television (CCTV) special feature on the 
pros and cons of incineration. With this, a growing national public and media debate about incineration, 
sparked by growing contention against waste incinerator projects and increasingly outspoken opposi-
tion by environmental organizations and experts, reached Panguanying. The CCTV program profiled sev-
eral national and international experts, including retired Beijing professor Zhao Zhangyuan, frequently 
cited as the Chinese ‘no-burn’ community’s leading expert. Apart from explicitly linking incineration to 
dioxins and cancer, the program also documented a recent successful case of public opposition to a 
proposed waste incinerator in Beijing’s Liulitun neighbourhood. Construction there was halted in 2007 
after hundreds of local residents protested, and the project was ultimately relocated within the city.
Farmer Pan made CD-ROM copies of the CCTV broadcast and villagers uncovered a plethora of 
online materials about the Liulitun campaign,54 most importantly a 40-page page ‘opinion booklet’ (
意见书, yijianshu) compiled by the Liulitun campaigners. It included detailed results of residents’ lay 
research regarding incineration and its harms, a critique of alleged procedural irregularities, and a 
detailed description of their struggle.55
These materials became invaluable resources for boosting the Panguanying campaigners’ knowledge, 
and for mobilizing broader support among villagers. With the help of a third man named Pan (again 
no direct relative) who became another core campaigner, villagers distributed copies of the Liulitun 
booklet and CD-ROM to Panguanying residents and anyone within a 5 km radius to warn of impending 
pollution.56 They collected approximately 1500 villager signatures, and stamps and statements from 37 
local village committees expressing opposition to the project.57 As one leading campaigner recalled:
Liulitun had a major influence on us. […] We copied the Liulitun materials and also copied the CCTV program on 
CD-ROM and distributed it to everyone in all the villages around. […] If I hadn’t had these things, the villagers 
wouldn’t have believed me. They weren’t clear on whether there would be pollution or not. They don’t understand 
these kinds of things, right? But once they saw these things, ah, that waste plants really cause pollution, it was over, 
[…] they unanimously opposed it.58
51interview pGy2 28-7-13; D_pGy22; cp. huage Shang, ‘Juji laji fenshaochang’ [‘Sniping Waste incinerators’], China Weekly 21 march 2013, 
http://www.chinaweekly.cn/bencandy.php?fid=63&id=6503 (accessed 20 July 2015); ‘Qinhuangdao nongmin laji fenshao 
Zujizhan’ [‘Qinhuangdao farmers’ War to Block Waste incineration’], Phoenix Weekly 1 march 2011, http://news.ifeng.com/fhzk/
detail_2011_03/01/4905732_0.shtml (accessed 17 april 2015).
52interviews pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 5-11-12, pGy3 28-7-13; cp. Shang, ‘Sniping Waste incinerators’; Da mao, ‘mao Da: Qinhuangdao 
nongmin de fan fen laji yundong’ [‘mao Da: Qinhuangdao farmers’ anti Waste incineration movement’], Green Sohu 20 may 2013, 
http://green.sohu.com/20130520/n376486520.shtml (accessed 27 november 2013).
53interviews pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 5-11-12; D_pGy4; cp. Shengke Gao, ‘Qinhuangdao laji fenshao Xiangmu Zao Dizhi. San nian Jiangju 
hen nan Dapo’ [‘Qinhuangdao Waste incinerator project Suffers resistance. three year Deadlock Difficult to Break’], Caijing 2 July 2012, 
http://news.qq.com/a/20120705/000735.htm (accessed 17 april 2015); Da mao, ‘Jianzheng Caogen liliang. Zoufang 
hebei funing Xian Jandui laji fenshaochang Jianshe ercun minji’ [‘Witnessing Grassroots power: record of Visit to Village 
opposing Waste incinerator in funing County, hebei’], blogpost on mao Da’s personal Sina blog, 22 october 2012, 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5fbaf32e01015y2t.html (accessed 21 July 2013); Shang, ‘Sniping Waste incinerators’.
54interviews pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 5-11-12.
55D_pGy24.
56interviews pGy1 4-11-12, 27-7-13, pGy2 5-11-12; cp. Shang, ‘Sniping Waste incinerators’.
57D_pGy22.
58interview pGy1 27-7-13.
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During these dissemination activities, local officials did not stand idly by.59 Town and city government 
officials visited the villages to defend the plant and promised that no pollution would result from the 
incinerator.60 However, villagers now possessed critical information from authoritative sources and an 
alternative cognitive framework with which to critically assess the government’s claims. When local 
officials threatened to charge campaigners with trouble-making and the illegal distribution of leaflets, 
they countered that distributing an official CCTV program was not illegal, nor was distributing leaflets 
that they had not written.61
Villagers deliberately imitated the Liulitun residents’ strategies,62 and their claims increasingly cen-
tred on the project’s environmental and health hazards rather than land. A process of frame alignment 
between Panguanying villagers, their Liulitun counterparts, and the wider ‘no-burn’ community began 
to occur. Villagers found a local university student to write their own ‘opinion booklet’, closely following 
the Liulitun blueprint.63 It contended that the siting decision was unlawful due to procedural flaws, the 
environmental and health threats confronting the approximately 30,000 residents within a 5 km radius, 
and the facility’s siting on a large stretch of farmland. It also criticized the social injustice of exposing rural 
dwellers to harmful incineration of waste mainly produced by urban residents.64 Similar to the Liulitun 
document, villagers’ opinion booklet reflected broader concerns and framing employed by incinera-
tion-opponents elsewhere, including questioning incineration as a suitable waste treatment strategy.
Villagers also identified themselves alongside other local communities fighting for their rights.65 The 
notion of ‘rights protection’ (维权 weiquan), also central to Liulitun residents’ self-perception, became a 
key identity frame for the farmers throughout their campaign.66 The discourse of ‘weiquan’, often suffixed 
with ‘campaign’ (运动, yundong), is frequently employed by the Chinese ‘no-burn’ community.67 This 
notion also featured prominently in the CCTV broadcast.
Vertical Linkages: The Role of Intermediaries
Villagers drew on their newly compiled materials to embark on another round of petitioning in 2010, 
but to little effect. Frustrated, campaigners sought external help. Upon discovering that Beijing-based 
environmental lawyer Xia had helped Liulitun residents file an administrative review application, the 
farmers contacted him for assistance.68 Xia agreed to help, hoping that this case could set a precedent 
for environmental litigation and create impact beyond Panguanying.69
59phoenix Weekly, ‘Qinhuangdao farmers’ War to Block Waste incineration’; Gao,‘Qinhuangdao Waste incinerator project Suffers 
resistance’; Shang, ‘Sniping Waste incinerators’.
60interview pGy1 27-7-13; phoenix Weekly, ‘Qinhuangdao farmers’ War to Block Waste incineration’; Shang, ‘Sniping Waste incinerators’.
61interview pGy2 27-7-13.
62interviews pGy1 4-11-12, 27-7-13, pGy2 27-7-13, 28-7-13.
63See note 57.
64ibid.
65ibid.
66cp. interviews pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 5-11-12, pGy3 28-7-13.
67cp. interviews lawyer Xia 6-11-12; Zhao 8-11-12; nGo nu1 7-11-12; nGo nu3 25-7-13; mao, ‘Witnessing Grassroots power’, liwen 
Chen, ‘Zhong Suo Qidai de Cunzhang Xuanju Bei liyi Jiuge de laji fenshaochang Jiaoluan’ [public’s long-awaited Village head 
election thrown into Waste incinerator Chaos by Special interest entanglements’], blogpost on Chen liwen’s personal Sina blog, 30 
november 2012, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_9613153701013xma.html accessed 7 april 2015; Zhangyuan Zhao, ‘Qinhuangdao 
fenshao Weiquan huodong: Zhongguo Jindai lishishang Gongzhong Canyu huanbao de Xin Dianxing’, [‘Qinhuangdao incineration 
rights-upholding Campaign: a new model of environmental protection Based on public participation unprecedented in modern 
Chinese history’], blogpost on Zhao Zhangyuan’s personal Sohu blog, 4 July 2012, http://zhaozhangyuan.blog.sohu.com/ accessed 
6 march 2014; Zhangyuan Zhao, ‘fenshao hunhe laji yi Cheng Guojie laoshu!’ [‘mixing incinerator Waste has Become like a mouse 
Crossing the road!], blogpost on Zhao Zhangyuan’s personal Sohu blog, 31 october 2012, http://zhaozhangyuan.blog.sohu.com/ 
(accessed 6 march 2014); Jun Xia, ‘Cong Qinhuangdao Xibu laji fenshao fadian Xiangmu fengbo Kan Weifa huanping Shenpi de 
e’guo’ [‘looking at the Bad Consequences of illegal eia approval from the Western Qinhuangdao Waste-to-energy project turmoil’], 
in: China Waste Information Network Newsletter 1, 18 July 2011, pp. 7–9.
68interview pGy2 5-11-12; cp. Shang, ‘Sniping Waste incinerators’; mao, ‘mao Da: Qinhuangdao farmers’ anti Waste incineration 
movement’.
69interview Xia 6-11-12.
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On Xia’s advice, the farmers filed an administrative review application with the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) and two other provincial-level institutions in August 2010, challenging 
the Hebei EPB’s earlier decision to approve the project due to procedural flaws.70 The MEP accepted the 
case in mid-September, and requested written statements from all involved parties, including the Hebei 
EPB and Zhejiang Weiming, who disputed the charges.71 To the villagers’ dismay, the MEP upheld the 
Hebei EPB’s decision, arguing that the villagers’ claims were not sufficiently founded.72
During the administrative review process, the MEP had disclosed the written statements to the 
farmers. In them the Hebei EPB and Zhejiang Weiming referred to an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) conducted in early 2009 by the Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences (中国气象科学研
究院, Zhongguo qixiang kexue yanjiuyuan, CAMS). They claimed that, consistent with the law, this EIA 
had been publicized locally and that public opinion had been solicited through the distribution of 
100 questionnaires, with the vast majority of respondents supporting the project.73 This agitated the 
villagers, who suspected foul-play.74 Their suspicions were strengthened by assessments of intermedi-
aries from Beijing who had become involved in the case. With help from Beijing-based environmental 
organization Nature University, lawyer Xia introduced villagers to Zhao Zhangyuan when they visited 
Beijing. Zhao then visited Panguanying in November 2010 to investigate,75 concluding that the loca-
tion was unsuitable for constructing an incinerator and that the entire EIA was severely flawed.76 Zhao 
briefed villagers on the risks of incineration and discussed anti-incineration struggles in other localities.77
Lawyer Xia also introduced the villagers to members of Nature University.78 They provided the vil-
lagers with information about incineration, experiences of other affected communities, and possible 
courses of action. Nature University members strongly urged the farmers to pursue a legal course of 
action and avoid violent clashes with the state.79 Moreover, organization staff raised the case’s profile 
by attracting media attention. When the Pans visited Beijing, they introduced their case at one of 
Nature University’s regular public lectures, with several media representatives in attendance.80 Nature 
University staff also disseminated the villagers’ claims via their personal networks and social media.81 
During this phase, however, media attention remained limited.
A First Victory: The EIA Fraud and Successful Environmental Litigation
Armed with new information and intermediary support, in January 2011 villagers launched an admin-
istrative lawsuit with a Shijiazhuang court against the Hebei EPB’s decision to approve the incinera-
tor.82 Following Xia’s advice, they centred their allegations on the EIA flaws discovered by Professor 
Zhao.83 Unexpectedly, this strategy proved successful. During the evidence collection procedures for 
the lawsuit, and to Xia’s great surprise, the Hebei EPB released a wide collection of internal government 
documents and the full EIA report.84 This included the 100 public participation questionnaires allegedly 
70D_pGy12 to D_pGy14; D_pGy27 to D_pGy29; interviews Xia 6-11-12, 30-7-13; Xia, looking at the Bad Consequences of illegal eia 
approval from the Western Qinhuangdao Waste-to-energy project turmoil’.
71D_pGy2, D_pGy30 to D_pGy32.
72ibid.; D_pGy10.
73D_pGy10, D_pGy31 to D_pGy32.
74interviews pGy1 4-11-12, pGy 2 5-11-12.
75interviews Zhao 8-11-12, Xia 6-11-12, pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 4-11-12, 27-7-13.
76interviews Zhao 8-11-12, pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 5-11-12, 27-7-13, nGo nu3 25-7-13; D_pGy4; Zhao, ‘Qinhuangdao incineration 
rights-upholding Campaign’.
77interviews Zhao 8-11-12, pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 5-11-12.
78interviews Xia 6-11-12, nGo nu2 18-10-11, nGo nu3 25-7-13, pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 5-11-12.
79ibid.; interview nGo nu1 7-11-12.
80ibid.
81interviews nGo nu1 7-11-12, nGo nu2 8-5-13, 1-7-15, nGo nu3 25-7-13.
82D_pGy37, D_pGy38.
83D_pGy41, D_pGy42.
84interviews pGy1 4-11-12, pGy2 27-7-13, Xia 6-11-12, 30-7-13.
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distributed to villagers, as well as the protocol of a villager representative meeting convened by the 
village committee in March 2009, where the villagers had allegedly signed in support of the project.85
Through these documents, Xia and the villagers received firm proof that the public participation 
process for the EIA had been forged. They verified that, although participants in the March 2009 meeting 
had indeed signed a document, they only did so to confirm receipt of a 10 RMB participation fee, and 
not in support of the incinerator.86 Furthermore, visits to villagers whose names and signatures had 
appeared on the questionnaires yielded written statements from them that they had ‘never seen this 
questionnaire, do not know who signed it, and do not agree with the construction of the incinerator’.87
In early March 2011, the Pans presented this evidence to the Shijiazhuang court as evidence. They 
notified Nature University staff, who wrote a lengthy letter to the MEP (D_PGY3). They also contacted 
a Phoenix Weekly journalist, who visited Panguanying and wrote a lengthy article about the case.88 
Confronted with fresh evidence, the Hebei EPB ordered an immediate construction halt.89 Three days 
before a court hearing scheduled for 30 May it revoked its official approval of the project EIA after discov-
ering that the court would rule in favour of the villagers due to flaws in the EIA process. The EPB ordered 
another EIA to be conducted, and in the meantime suspended all EIA applications for Qinhuangdao 
City.90 Having achieved their aims, the Pans withdrew their lawsuit in early June.91
Intermediaries viewed this outcome as a major victory, not only for Panguanying villagers, but also 
as a precedent for successful national-level environmental litigation against failure to implement the 
EIA law.92 Zhao called the Panguanying case a ‘new model of environmental protection based on public 
participation unprecedented in modern Chinese history’.93 Intermediaries hoped that they could use the 
Panguanying success to persuade other affected communities to favour legal channels over disruptive 
and potentially violent actions.94
New Battlefronts: Widening NGO Engagement and National-level Issue Campaigns
The incinerator controversy did not end there, however. First, Nature University staff discovered that 
Zhejiang Weiming had applied for the project to be granted Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
status in mid-June.95 Worried that this status would help justify the project’s restart, in June 2011 eight 
Chinese environmental organizations submitted a critical comment on the project to UNFCCC with sup-
port from transnational organizations Global Alliance of Incinerator Alternatives (GAIA) and CDM Watch. 
Second, five of these organizations petitioned the MEP in an open letter to bar CAMS from conducting 
EIAs based on the fraud practised in Panguanying and another site.96 Although this campaign generated 
much media attention, it did not produce major responses from the MEP at this time. Third, after the 
85D_pGy43, D_pGy44.
86D_pGy45.
87D_pGy46 to D_pGy47.
88phoenix Weekly, ‘Qinhuangdao farmers’ War to Block Waste incineration’.
89D_pGy48, D_pGy49.
90D_pGy42; interview lawyer Xia 30-7-13.
91D_pGy42; interviews pGy1 4-11-12, pGy2 4-11-12.
92interviews Xia 30-7-13; Xia, ‘looking at the Bad Consequences of illegal eia approval from the Western Qinhuangdao Waste-to-
energy project turmoil’; Zhao, ‘Qinhuangdao incineration rights-upholding Campaign’; mao, ‘mao Da: Qinhuangdao farmers’ anti 
Waste incineration movement’; Chen, ‘public’s long-awaited Village head election thrown into Waste incinerator Chaos by Special 
interest entanglements’; cp. Gao, ‘Qinhuangdao Waste incinerator project Suffers resistance’; phoenix Weekly, ‘Qinhuangdao farmers’ 
War to Block Waste incineration’.
93Zhao, ‘Qinhuangdao incineration rights-upholding Campaign’.
94interviews Xia 6-11-12, 30-7-13, nGo nu1 7-11-12, nGo nu3 25-7-13.
95D_pGy11.
96fon, ‘huanping Bei Zhi Zuojia. Wu huanbao Zuzhi Shenqing Quxiao Qikeyuan Zizhi’ [‘eia Contains fakery. five environmental 
organisations apply for China academy of meteorological Sciences Qualifications to be Cancelled’], post on fon organization 
website, 21 June 2011, http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php/index/cate/id/92 (accessed 6 august 2015); mao, ‘mao Da: Qinhuangdao 
farmers’ anti Waste incineration movement’; linlin liu, ‘Defrauding the environment’, in Global Times 17 January 2013, http://
www.globaltimes.cn/content/756622.shtml (accessed 12 february 2013); interviews nGo nu1 7-11-12, nGo nu3 25-7-13, nGo 
fon1 19-10-12.
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MEP announced that it had accepted Zhejiang Weiming’s application to conduct an environmental 
examination as a prerequisite for its stock market entrance, both villagers and environmental organi-
zations petitioned the MEP to deny the application.97 Again, however, the MEP remained unmoved.98
In February 2012, it emerged that Zhejiang Weiming planned to restart construction.99 In May and 
June 2012, high-ranking company personnel discussed their plans with Nature University staff and 
lawyer Xia, and invited them and Professor Zhao to visit one of their incinerators near Shanghai.100 
Nature University took this as a sign that their efforts in Panguanying and elsewhere were being taken 
seriously. They urged the company to communicate directly with the villagers, whilst also relaying 
villagers’ claims and concerns. Although Zhejiang Weiming met with the Pans to explore the prospect 
of restarting the project, the farmers insisted that a new EIA process must be conducted and that the 
villagers would oppose the project.101 Meanwhile, the Pans – supported by lawyer Xia, a Beijing-based 
law professor, and the China Lawyers Association – launched an administrative redress challenging the 
MEP’s decision to ratify Zhejiang Weiming’s IPO application and, after its failure, two successive lawsuits 
against the MEP. Although these appeals reached the Beijing Municipality Higher People’s Court, they 
were dismissed in September 2012.102
Back to Local: Running for Village Elections and Growing Media Attention
Faced with these set-backs and with the possible resumption of the incinerator project, the farmers 
continued to challenge the legality of the project’s land requisition. For this they needed the stamp of 
the village committee as official proprietor of the requisitioned land. Village head Qiao, an incinerator 
proponent, had refused to provide this stamp. Villagers believed that, if one of them could be elected 
village head, they could halt the project once and for all by dismantling the construction site and 
returning the land to its original agricultural designation.103
In late 2011, Qiao had been forced to resign from office by the infuriated villager community. The 
periodic village election in Panguanying was scheduled for February 2012, with one of the Pans standing 
for election with broad support among the villagers.104 Although the election was delayed, and Pan was 
exposed to pressure from local officials, he continued to stand for election. The struggle in the village 
had now gone beyond the incinerator project to incorporate broader local political entanglements. 
During this phase, Nature University staffs’ main role became one of protecting the Pans. In September 
2012 they visited Panguanying for the first time, and called on the media to report on the upcoming 
election.105 Around that time, the MEP was examining several hundred EIA units, and had urged the 
media to expose EIA-related malpractices.106 In this context, the Panguanying story was reported by 
numerous outlets including the People’s Daily107 and Caixin.108 The dissemination efforts by Nature 
University also yielded a steady stream of external visitors to Panguanying including journalists, inter-
mediaries, and researchers, including the researchers of this article.
97D_pGy48, D_pGy49; interviews pGy2 5-11-12, nGo nu3 25-7-13, Xia 30-7-13; mao, ‘mao Da: Qinhuangdao farmers’ anti Waste 
incineration movement’; Gao, ‘Qinhuangdao Waste incinerator project Suffers resistance’.
98D_pGy49.
99interviews pGy1 4-11-12, pGy2 4-11-12; Gao, ‘Qinhuangdao Waste incinerator project Suffers resistance’.
100interviews Xia 6-11-12, nGo nu1 7-11-12, nGo nu2 25-7-13.
101interviews pGy1 4-11-12, pGy2 5-11-12.
102D_pGy49, D_pGy57, D_pGy59 to D_pGy61; interviews pGy1 4-11-12, Xia 6-11-12.
103interviews pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 5-11-12, pGy3 28-7-13.
104ibid.; linlin liu, ‘Villagers protest Delayed election’, in Global Times 30 november 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/747434.
shtml (accessed 5 December 2012); liu, ‘Defrauding the environment; linlin liu, ‘hebei Villagers Disrupt illegal‘ election’, in: Global 
Times 31 December 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/753122.shtml (accessed 7 January 2013).
105mao, ‘Witnessing Grassroots power’; interviews nGo nu1 7-11-12, nGo nu2 29-10-12, nGo nu3 25-7-13.
106interviews nGo nu1 7-11-12, nGo nu3 25-7-13.
107yang liu, ‘huanping Jigou Jing Zheyang Zaojia’ [‘eia unit actually engages in this Kind of forgery’], People’s Daily, 29 January 
2013, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2013-01/29/nw.D110000renmrb_20130129_4-04.htm (accessed 12 march 2014).
108Zheng Cui, ‘huanbaobu tongbao Chufa 88 Jia huanping Jigou’ [‘ministry of environmental protection announces penalties for 88 
eia units’] Caixin Magazine, (8 January 2013), http://china.caixin.com/2013-01-08/100480553.html (accessed 21 august 2013); 
Zheng Cui, ‘niezao 100 ge huanping tongyi’ [fabrication of 100 eia agreements’], Caixin Magazine, 8 february 2013, http://m.
magazine.caixin.com/m/2013-02-08/100490909.html?p1, (accessed 21 august 2013).
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At candidate Pan’s request, Nature University staff acted as unofficial election observers,109 arriv-
ing on the eve of the election with a journalist friend from the Global Times. However, the election 
descended into chaos after three armed men burst into the polling station and destroyed ballots and 
voting boxes, before escaping unchallenged.110 Nature University staff reported on the events via their 
social media accounts and the Global Times journalist penned a story for the paper’s English-language 
edition.111
A replacement election the following month was also interrupted and no new village head was 
elected. Scuffles broke out between villagers, public security forces and town government cadres. 
Some villagers forced their way into the vote counting room, to discover that election staff had hidden 
numerous ballot slips in their clothes to distort the results.112 Several dozen villagers appealed to the 
Funing county government for a new election, and once again Nature University staff and the Global 
Times journalist reported on the events.113
The Aftermath: Coming to an Impasse and Becoming a ‘Major Environmental Case’
Five days after the second failed election, three villagers – including one of the Pans – were sum-
moned to the Funing county public security bureau accused of ‘disrupting public order’.114 Pan, who 
vehemently denied the charges, immediately contacted Nature University staff.115 They disseminated 
the villagers’ information via their networks and social media channels, and the Global Times journalist 
wrote another article.116 According to Pan, these actions helped in having the charges dropped.117 In 
mid-January 2013, the Pans petitioned the county and town governments about election problems.118 
The township denied malpractice and announced that, in the absence of a village head, a government 
working group would be stationed in the village to preserve order.119
In mid-August 2013, the town government informed villagers that they were considering dismantling 
the construction site. As of 2016, no official timeline for doing so has been announced, however.120 
Although the incinerator issue has not been comprehensively resolved, farmers nonetheless felt victo-
rious.121 Widespread external attention, and the great value attached to the case by intermediaries as a 
unique case of successful local resistance against EIA fraud positively affected the Pans’ self-perception. 
This change was observable in how they presented their case during the different field visits. In 2012, 
they focused on the villagers’ rightful struggle for a clean environment, transparency regarding the 
procedures and their right to local political participation.122 By 2013 their self-perception had broad-
ened beyond their individual struggle. They now portrayed themselves as fighting for social justice, 
and presented their case as an exemplary case of local environmental contention, which they hoped 
109interviews pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 27-7-13, nGo nu2 26-3-14; Chen, ‘public’s long-awaited Village head election thrown into Waste 
incinerator Chaos by Special interest entanglements’.
110interviews pGy1 27-7-13pGy3 28-7-13, nGo nu3 25-7-13; Chen, ‘public’s long-awaited Village head election thrown into Waste 
incinerator Chaos by Special interest entanglements’; liu, ‘Villagers protest Delayed election’; liu, ‘Defrauding the environment’; 
liu, ‘hebei Villagers Disrupt illegal election’.
111Chen, ‘public’s long-awaited Village head election thrown into Waste incinerator Chaos by Special interest entanglements’; liu, 
‘Villagers protest Delayed election’; liu, ‘Defrauding the environment’.
112ibid.; interviews pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 27-7-13, pGy3 28-7-13, nGo nu3 25-7-13; mao, ‘mao Da: Qinhuangdao farmers’ anti Waste 
incineration movement’.
113liu, ‘hebei Villagers Disrupt illegal election’.
114ibid.
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118D_pGy62.
119D_pGy63; cp. Shang, ‘Sniping Waste incinerators’.
120interview nGo nu2 1-7-15.
121interviews pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 27-7-13, pGy3 28-7-13.
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would have a national impact and encourage also other communities to defend their rights and the 
environment.123
Analysis: The Role of Horizontal and Vertical Ties in the Panguanying Villagers’ 
Environmental Contention
This section analyses the role of horizontal and vertical ties in the Panguanying case. Although they 
are closely interrelated in how they affected the villagers’ contention, we discuss them successively for 
greater clarity.
The Role of Horizontal Ties
Villagers’ ties with other contentious communities were limited and mainly restricted to non-relational 
ties. These linkages nonetheless were pivotal in the development of the villagers’ resistance, thus 
demonstrating that horizontal diffusion processes between different localities can impact upon local 
environmental contention and contribute to the geographic spread of resistance in China. In particular, 
the Liulitun campaign crucially impacted the Panguanying case. Initially, information concerning the 
Liulitun campaign reached villagers mainly through the mass media and the internet. Although the 
majority of villagers lacked the ability to access this information, individuals such as the local teacher 
and younger relatives of the Pans helped bridge this gap. These non-relational linkages were later com-
plemented by engaged intermediaries who, playing a brokerage role, transmitted information about 
anti-incineration struggles from other Chinese localities to the Panguanying villagers.
This information was crucial in developing villagers’ awareness and shifting their claims and framing 
from land and corruption to concerns about environmental pollution and health hazards. The trans-
mitted information certified campaign leaders’ claims regarding environmental and health hazards 
posed by the plant. Both the CCTV broadcast and the Liulitun ‘opinion booklet’ also provided alternative 
interpretive frames and cognitive cues questioning waste incineration as a panacea for China’s waste 
problem, which, together with information on waste incineration and its risks, enabled them to critically 
assess government claims.
The materials also fostered frame alignment between the Panguanying villagers, Liulitun residents, 
and the broader ‘no-burn’ community. Both the CCTV program and the Liulitun materials helped shift 
the villagers’ contentious identity from centring on lawful land rights to being part of a broader ‘weiquan’ 
community in China. Furthermore, the Liulitun and CCTV materials helped village leaders mobilize 
support from the wider village community and surrounding village committees. They also shielded 
farmers from local government pressure and charges of trouble-making.
The Panguanying villagers directly emulated Liulitun residents through their own ‘opinion booklet’ 
and through engaging lawyer Xia and his legal strategy. As well as facilitating Panguanying villagers’ 
access to justice, the Liulitun campaign also changed their perceptions of threat and opportunity by 
instilling belief that citizen resistance can be successful. Similarly, the Liulitun materials also encouraged 
the village leaders to contact other intermediaries such as Professor Zhao, with important implications 
for their campaign. As summarized by one of the village leaders:
We drew a lesson from them [Liulitun], we learned from them. We used their strong points to mend our shortcom-
ings. Because they understand everything. So we also drew a lesson from their methods to do this. […] If it hadn’t 
been for the Liulitun plant issue, we really wouldn’t have known […] from where to start.124
However, village campaigners did not establish relational ties with Liulitun residents. They claimed to 
have learned enough from the online materials and through intermediaries involved in the Liulitun 
struggle.125 Similarly, they did not collaborate with villagers from Beijing’s Dagong village who also 
faced EIA fraud at the hands of CAMS. While joint claims regarding the fraud practiced by CAMS in both 
123interviews pGy1 27-7-13, pGy2 28-7-13.
124interview pGy1 4-11-12.
125interviews pGy1 4-11-12, pGy2 27-7-13.
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Panguanying and Dagong emerged, these were produced by environmental organizations engaged in 
both cases, not by local communities. Although Nature University introduced the Panguanying cam-
paigners to members of other contentious communities during their visits to the capital, these rela-
tional ties were not taken further. This was partly due to the different strategies employed by Beijing 
homeowners, who largely relied on large-scale ‘strolls’ to demonstrate their opposition to incinerator 
projects.126 Moreover, the village leaders regarded the Gaoantun and Dagong cases as examples of 
unsuccessful local contention (opposition in both cases failed to thwart incinerator projects), thus dis-
couraging active exchange with community members.127
The Role of Vertical Ties
Vertical linkages with supra-local members of the Chinese ‘no-burn’ community were also pivotal in 
the development of environmental contention in Panguanying. Village campaigners repeatedly high-
lighted their importance:
All the ones that have donated themselves to the environmental issue, experts, professors, lawyers, the media: Their 
help was immense. That waste plant, if it hadn’t been for these people, we absolutely […] wouldn’t have known 
what to do. […] Really, it was only with their help that we could do this.128
Zhao Zhangyuan was the first intermediary involved in the Panguanying struggle. He raised villagers’ 
awareness by providing critical information and interpretive frames regarding waste incineration and 
related risks – first via the non-relational channels provided by the CCTV broadcast and the Liulitun 
materials, and later in person. Here, Liulitun campaigners, who referred to Zhao in their Opinion Booklet, 
functioned indirectly as brokers between him and the Panguanying villagers. Zhao’s status as renowned 
professor and waste expert enhanced the farmers’ cognitive justification for taking action based on 
environmental concerns. His pointing out of EIA flaws provided the basis for villagers’ further actions, 
including environmental litigation. Zhao also certified villagers’ claims externally through documenting 
the case via his personal blog and through being cited as an ‘expert’ in Chinese media reports about 
the case.
Lawyer Xia also played a crucial role. Based on his professional assessment and his experiences with 
the Liulitun case, he advised village campaigners to shift the focus of their legal action from the land 
issue towards environmental litigation based on EIA flaws, thus significantly impacting the villagers’ 
course of action. Apart from providing legal assistance, Xia also brokered connections between villagers 
and both professor Zhao and members of Nature University. Moreover, similar to Zhao, he published 
articles and gave lectures on the case, thus disseminating and certifying the villagers’ cause externally 
towards the public and the media.
The third major engaged party was Nature University staff, who played a multifaceted role during 
the struggle albeit in later stages of the campaign. Initially, it mainly focused on disseminating infor-
mation regarding the villagers’ claims via its online and personal networks and by inviting the villagers 
to issue-specific meetings in Beijing. The organization brokered ties between the villagers and media 
representatives as well as with other contentious communities and ‘no burn’ community members. 
The steady stream of visitors, including journalists and researchers, initiated by Nature University staff 
in 2012, helped protect village leaders from repercussions by Party-state officials, and brought their 
cause to the broader public. Nature University also advocated the villagers’ cause in petitions and open 
letters to the MEP. Together with lawyer Xia, it helped represent villagers in their communication with 
Zhejiang Weiming. In addition, during their first field visit to Panguanying, members of the organization 
provided issue-specific knowledge and advice, helped collect evidence related to EIA flaws, and offered 
specific assistance regarding the organization of action. During the village elections, they served as 
unofficial election observers and played a protective role.
126Johnson, ‘the politics of Waste incineration in Beijing’.
127interviews pGy1 5-11-12, pGy2 28-7-13; D_pGy22.
128See note 58.
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While other environmental organizations were loosely engaged in the case, their engagement was 
confined to participating in the above-mentioned advocacy activities, and they did not establish direct 
relational ties with the villagers.
Whereas horizontal diffusion was mainly based on non-relational ties, vertical linkages between 
villagers and intermediaries were predicated upon personal interactions. There are several likely reasons 
for this. First, both villagers and intermediaries had something to gain from collaborating. This was not 
the case with, for example, Liulitun campaigners who had already succeeded in winning their battle. 
Second, intermediaries such as Xia, Zhao and various journalists who covered the case were, to some 
extent, ‘embedded’ within the party-state. One of their main goals was to use the case as a precedent for 
advancing better environmental governance practices within the existing one-party system. And third, 
geographical proximity to Beijing played a role – high speed rail links between Beijing and Beidaihe 
meant that Panguanying could be reached in approximately three hours from the capital.
Conclusion: Towards a Broader Movement?
Horizontal and vertical ties have started to connect different actors involved in Chinese anti-incineration 
contention, affecting the spread and development of environmental contention. The Panguanying 
case examined in this article is not an isolated example – intermediaries such as Nature University have 
been involved in multiple local struggles against waste incinerators and other unpopular projects129 
and learning processes between different communities have also been observed in other issue fields.130 
Rather than proceeding along separate tracks, as much of the literature suggests, ‘environmentalist’ 
and ‘grievance-based’ activism in China are increasingly interrelated and can be mutually reinforcing.
To what extent might these emerging linkages bridging environmentalist and grievance-based 
concerns contribute to an upward scale-shift, namely collaborative action spanning different sites of 
contention, claims and issue interpretations that reach beyond local grievances, as well as broader 
collective identities and new organizational forms and alliances? In one sense, the prospects for scaling 
up appear limited. Horizontal relational linkages between different contentious communities remain 
severely constrained. Panguanying villagers insisted that they did not reach out directly to similar 
communities because they saw limited value in doing so. This was likely also related to the pervasive 
political sensitivity towards cross-regional collective action. As several intermediaries stressed, when 
it comes to environmental contention, the onus remains firmly on local communities to stand up and 
fight for their rights.
However, whilst coordinated cooperation based on relational ties between communities remains 
taboo, cognitive alignment and tactical sharing are harder to control. Panguanying villagers aligned 
their interpretive frames and claims with other contentious communities and the broader ‘no-burn’ com-
munity, and developed a contentious identity that transcended the village level. This echoes findings 
from other studies that highlight considerable learning across protesting communities that can access 
information about other cases through the mass media and internet.131 Whilst it may be premature to 
speak of an anti-incinerator movement in China, our article adds further empirical support to Steinhardt 
and Wu’s claim that broadened protest constituencies are emerging that contest pollution and bridge 
community activism with broader policy advocacy goals.132
This article also demonstrates how local community resistance rooted in local political issues can 
significantly enhance national-level actors’ struggles (in this case, the no-burn community) for greater 
awareness about risks associated with waste incineration and for better transparency and proper EIA 
law implementation. This has also been demonstrated with regards to other issue fields.133 Two points 
are worth noting here. First, this process can be mutually reinforcing, benefiting local communities and 
129Sun et al., ‘political Contexts and environmental forces linking up’.
130Zhu, ‘Backfired Government action and the Spillover effect of Contention’.
131Zhu, ‘Backfired Government action and the Spillover effect of Contention’; Steinhardt and Wu, ‘in the name of the public’.
132Steinhardt and Wu, ‘in the name of the public’.
133See note 129.
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supporting environmentalists’ cause. The exposure of cases such as Panguanying to a broader audience 
draws attention to problems that Chinese environmentalists have long been concerned with, such 
as weak implementation of EIA provisions, limited transparency and public participation, and, more 
specifically, risks associated with the rapid spread of waste incineration in China. Whereas supra-local 
organizations have often been viewed as coordinators of collective campaigns involving multiple local-
level groups in more liberal settings, the China example shows how disparate community campaigns can 
strengthen the position of intermediaries such as environmental organizations and contribute to wider 
issues such as regulatory failures or governance reform. For local communities, intermediary support 
can offer awareness, protection, publicity, certification and resources such as technical information and 
legal advice that help them navigate the uncertain terrain of environmental contention in China. And 
second, vertical ties of the kind examined in this article are largely embedded in Party-state policies 
that, for example, nominally support public participation and access to environmental information. By 
encouraging and supporting the channelling of dissent through legal processes (however imperfect 
they might be),134 national-level actors arguably help ensure that disputes are resolved within exist-
ing power structures. Rather than representing a threat to the Party-state therefore, these actors can 
potentially contribute to maintaining social stability.
While the Panguanying case thus points to the limitations of a ‘scaling up’ of local contention based on 
collaborative efforts between different affected communities, it shows that the vertical linkages between 
local communities and the national-level ‘no-burn’ community may indeed strengthen a national-level 
issue network that tackles not only the risks related to waste incineration, but also broader environ-
mental issues. This finding is not restricted to the case of waste incineration, but has also been demon-
strated for PX related risks, where local concerns have produced a national issue-campaign headed by 
environmentalists.135 Moreover, it shows how information technology enables communities to actively 
learn from each other and draw from a readily available information source to fight for environmental 
rights. Although political constraints undermine the formation of personal cross-community ties, local 
environmental campaigns such as opposition to waste incinerators are no longer a purely isolated affair.
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PGY3 28-7-13. Panguanying village leader 3, Panguanying, July 28, 2013.
Xia 6-11-12. Lawyer Xia, Beijing, November 6, 2012.
Xia 30-7-13. Lawyer Xia, Beijing, July 30, 2013.
Zhao 8-11-12. Zhao Zhangyuan, Beijing, November 8, 2012.
